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SOPHISTICATION AND THE
ANTECEDENTS OF WHITES’ RACIAL
POLICY ATTITUDES




Abstract A number of researchers have argued that the effects of
prejudice on the racial policy attitudes and general political beliefs of
white Americans may be restricted to the poorly educated and politically
unsophisticated. In contrast, rather than being motivated by prejudice,
the racial policy attitudes and ideological values of the politically so-
phisticated white Americans should be more ﬁrmly informed and mo-
tivated by the tolerant values at the heart of American political culture.
These values include such things as individualism, notions of fair play,
and devotion to the principle of equality of opportunity. We tested this
hypothesis using white respondents from the 1986 and 1992 National
Election Studies. Our evidence generally indicated that racial policy
attitudes and political ideology were more powerfully associated with
ideologies of racial dominance and superiority among politically so-
phisticated white Americans than among political unsophisticated white
Americans. Moreover, even among the sophisticated, we found that
various forms of egalitarianism predicted support for—rather than op-
position to—afﬁrmative action and that support for equal opportunity
is not uniformly distributed across the political spectrum.
Studies of the momentous changes in public opinion that accompanied the civil
rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s have generally reached a common
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conclusion about the trajectory of white racial attitudes over the last 40 years.
While support for segregation and overt discrimination has given way to support
for the formal principle of racial equality, this change has not been accompanied
by increased white support for “race-targeted” policies aimed at implementing
this principle, such as afﬁrmative action (see Schuman et al. 1997; Sears 1988;
Sears et al. 2000; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Despite general consensus on
this point, students of race relations in America have disagreed sharply about
the origins of this “principle-implementation” gap.
On the one hand, consistent with the notion of an overall decline in racism
among whites, a number of researchers have argued that white opposition to
policies like afﬁrmative action is now primarily a function of race-neutral
political considerations, such as conservatism, individualism, and opposition
to “big government,” and that these considerations are themselves orthogonal
to racist motives (Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman, Crosby, and
Howell 2000; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). According to this perspective,
whites oppose policies like afﬁrmative action not out of a dislike for blacks
or a desire to maintain their group’s privileged position, but because they
sincerely believe that such policies enshrine a regime of preferentialtreatment.
In other words, it suggests that whites reject afﬁrmative action for many of
the same reasons they now oppose the sort of institutionalized discrimination
dismantled by the civil rights movement: namely, because it violates key
elements of what Gunnar Myrdal (1944) famously referredtoasthe“American
Creed,” such as equality before the law and equality of opportunity (see
Connerly 1996), principles now thought to be consensually accepted through-
out the mainstream political spectrum (Sniderman and Piazza 1993).
On the other hand, other researchers have suggested that racial prejudice
and desires for group dominance continue to inﬂuence white attitudes toward
these policies (e.g., Blumer 1961; Bobo 1988, 2000; Gilens 1999; Jackman
1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Sidanius
et al. 2000; Turner, Singleton, and Musick 1984). This outlook suggests that
a desire to preserve the white ingroup’s interests and privileged position may
still be responsible for opposition to policies aimed at implementing the prin-
ciple of racial equality, even if racism is generally less prevalent than in the
past. Moreover, while agreeing that support forequalopportunityhasincreased
over the last few decades, these researchers also suggest that values of this
sort are not endorsed to the same degree across the ideological spectrum,
raising the possibility that disagreement about the value of formal equality
may be more fundamental to American political culture than many have as-
sumed (see Dawson 2000; Smith 1997).
While much of this debate has taken the form of a basic disagreement about
the relative explanatory power of racial and race-neutral predispositions and
the degree to which concern for formal equality has become evenly diffused
throughout the political spectrum, an additional—and perhaps more interest-
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these variables has also arisen. Consistent with a long line of studiesindicating
that education tends to promote tolerance (see Lipset 1960; McClosky and
Zaller 1984; Steinberg and Selznick 1969), analyses suggesting a reduced role
for prejudice in white racial policy attitudes have also argued that this should
particularly be the case among educated whites. More precisely, several re-
searchers have argued that education may attenuate the relationship between
racial hostility and opposition to afﬁrmative action, as well as the relationship
between racism and various race-neutral predispositions (see Sniderman et al.
1991). Since poorly educated individuals lack the expertise necessary for the
comprehension and use of abstract political concepts, their racial policy at-
titudes—and more broadly, their general political outlook—should be more
heavily colored by prejudiced considerations. In contrast, the knowledge pos-
sessed by well-educated individuals should allow them to bring complex
ideological principles to bear on their racial policy attitudes (see Sniderman,
Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Sniderman et al. 1991). For example, in a review
and endorsement of this approach, Jacoby writes, “Education also plays an
important part in determining attitudes, but not simply because moreeducation
correlates with less racial prejudice: more educated whites are also more
inﬂuenced by political ideas, thus amplifying the role of ideology and dimin-
ishing the relevance of race per se” (1994, p. 37; emphasis added). Thus,
while racism and conservatism are perhaps not completely independent of
one another, this correlation may be largely restricted to the poorly educated,
who should be less aware of the actual principles underlying conservative
ideology and the American Creed.
At a broader level, this line of reasoning also suggests that the increase in
sophistication associated with schooling should make it easier for well-edu-
cated survey respondents to recognize the basic conﬂict between intolerant
attitudes and the support for equal opportunity thought to be embodied in the
American Creed—values believed to be accepted by liberalsandconservatives
alike at this point in history, given the decline in overt racism over the last
few decades (see Sniderman et al. 1991; Sniderman, Tetlock, and Carmines
1993; see also McClosky and Zaller 1984; Zaller 1992). Thus, while thenotion
of consensual support for equal opportunity generally suggests a minimal
relationship between ideology and concern for equal opportunity, it also sug-
gests that this ideologically even pattern of support for formal equality may
be most evident among the educated, who should be most aware of the fun-
damentally tolerant norms of American political culture. While investigators
have not thoroughly examined the issue of whether concern for equal op-
portunity has become ideologically consensual, research has provided some
evidence for the idea that education may reduce the degree to which prejudice
is bound up with policy attitudes and generalized political predispositions.
For example, Sniderman and his colleagues (e.g., Sniderman and Piazza 1993;
Sniderman et al. 1991) have found that college-educated conservatives are no
more likely than college-educated liberals to practice a double standard by148 Federico and Sidanius
offering greater support to government efforts to guarantee equal opportunity
for women than to similar efforts targeted at blacks. In contrast, both poorly
educated conservatives and poorly educated liberals tend to offer less support
to black-targeted equal opportunity initiatives.
Despite these ﬁndings, other analyses have offered less support for the
hypothesis that education should attenuate the effects of racism and have
instead suggested that education may simply allow individuals to better align
their racial policy preferences—and broader political outlook—with a desire
to protect the dominant position of the in-group. In this vein, Sidanius and
his colleagues (Sidanius et al. 1996, 2000; see also Sidanius and Pratto 1999)
have found that education may strengthen the effects of racism and other
group-relevant attitudes. In several samples of whites, they found that classical
racism and group-based antiegalitarianism had a stronger relationship with
both afﬁrmative-action attitudes and generalized conservatism among the
highly educated. Results such as these imply that the increases in political
understanding associated with education may not lead whites to rely more
heavily on race-neutral considerations when making policy judgments. In fact,
in certain cases, they suggest that individuals with a better understanding of
basic political concepts may ﬁnd it easier to connect their attitudes toward
group-relevant social policies with both the perceived interests of their own
groups and their attitudes toward the out-groups the policies are designed to
beneﬁt (see Sidanius et al. 1996; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; see also Jackman
and Muha 1984).
1 At a broader level, the existence of these relationships
suggests that concern for equal opportunity—although stronger and more
consensually expressed than in the past—is still not evenly distributed across
the political spectrum, since conservatism may in part be rooted in a desire
for group dominance (as suggested by a large body of research linking con-
servative attitudes to racism and antiegalitarianism; see Sidanius and Pratto
1993; Sidanius et al. 1996, 2000). Moreover, in line with the ﬁnding that
education may actually strengthen the inﬂuence of antiegalitarian motives like
racism, thismay beparticularlytrueofeducatedrespondents,whoareprecisely
those people most likely to understand both the hierarchy-enhancing impli-
cations of conservative ideology and the manner in which this ideology serves
their competitive group interests.
On the whole, then, existing evidence does not provide a clear pattern of
support for the hypothesis that education should attenuate the effects of racial
prejudice and produce a more consensual pattern of support for equal op-
portunity. However, a closer examination of the ways in which education is
typically assumed to affect the relationship between prejudice, race-neutral
1. This is, of course, consistent with one of the more general conclusions reached by studies of
attitude constraint and belief-system structure: i.e, the idea that sophisticated individuals should
be more attuned to the implicational connections between different sets of beliefs (Converse
1964; Judd and Krosnick 1989; Lavine, Thomsen, and Gonzales 1997; Stimson 1975; Zaller
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values, and racial policy attitudes—along with recent work on the concep-
tualization and measurement of political understanding—suggests that the
underlying content of this hypothesis may not have been adequately tested,
by either its proponents or its critics. More precisely, most work on the effects
of education on racial attitudes (e.g., Steinberg and Selznick 1969) implies
that the effect of education on the organization of racial policy attitudesshould
be of a mediated rather than a direct character. That is, education should
diminish the inﬂuence of racial prejudice primarily by virtue of its salutary
effects on the learning and comprehension of abstract political concepts (cf.
Bishop 1976; Stimson 1975; see also McClosky and Zaller 1984; Zaller1990).
By providing individuals with a better understanding of the ideas that animate
mainstream political discourse, education is thought to facilitate the use of
abstract ideological concepts and a deeper recognition of the basic incom-
patibility between racism and the norms of American political culture, thereby
reducing the impact of purely prejudicial considerations. For example, Sni-
derman and Piazza (1993) highlight this mediated aspect of the effects of
education when they note that “the better educated, by virtue of being better
informed, more adept at picking up and processing information, and better
able to handle abstract ideas, are more likely to have a grip on the ofﬁcial
norms of the larger culture, which in the case of the United States prominently
include tolerance” (p. 47; emphasis added).
In essence, then, hypotheses about the effects of education on the policy
impact of prejudice would seem to focus most directly on the role of political
sophistication, with education merely serving as an indicator of the latter. How-
ever, recent work has increasingly suggested that education may not be the most
reliable measure of political sophistication. While education may very well
provide individuals with the cognitive sophistication necessary for an advanced
understanding of politics (e.g., Bishop 1976; Stimson 1975), it does not guar-
antee attention to and comprehension of political ideas, as suggested by the
relatively low correlation between education and various measures of interest
in politics, such as media exposure to political information (see Zaller 1990,
1992; see also Converse 1980). In light of this observation—and the shortcom-
ings of other measures of political sophistication, such as political interest and
involvement—a number of theorists have suggested that tests of politicalknowl-
edge may provide the most accurate portrait of a given individual’s level of
political understanding (Fiske, Lau, and Smith 1990; Zaller 1990; see also
Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Lau 1990; Lavine et al. 1997). Although there
are a number of reasons for this expectation (see Fiske et al. 1990), perhaps
the most important of these is inherent in the notion of factual political knowl-
edge itself: as Zaller (1990) has observed, more than any other measure, knowl-
edge “captures political learning that has actually occurred—that is, political
ideas that have been encountered and comprehended and remain available for
use” (p. 131). Education, while clearly connected to knowledge and awareness150 Federico and Sidanius
(Bishop 1976; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991), may not in and of itself
be as indicative of a genuine understanding of politics.
Empirical studies of the relative predictive utility of various political-so-
phistication measures have reinforced this general conclusion. One of the most
comprehensive of these studies was conducted by Susan Fiske and her col-
leagues (Fiske et al. 1990), who looked at the relationship between a series
of political-sophistication measures and advantages in the processing of po-
litical information. A factor analysis of the sophistication measures suggested
ﬁve basic dimensions of political sophistication: political knowledge, political
activity, electronicmediause, printmediause,and“politicalself-schematicity”
(i.e., thinking of oneself as liberal or conservative). Further analyses revealed
that, of these ﬁve factors, political knowledge was the most usefulinpredicting
the sort of information-processing beneﬁts suggested by theoretical models
of political schematicity and understanding (see Fiske et al 1990; Lodge and
Hamill 1986), such as reduced reading time for political materials, quicker
decision making, and improved recall for relevant stimulus items. Perhaps
even more importantly—given the focus of the present investigation—other
analyses have suggested that political knowledge may also be a better index
of the degree to which survey respondents are able to perceive implicational
links among related ideas and use ideological considerations to structure their
policy attitudes. In this vein, a number of studies have indicated that factual
political knowledge is a stronger predictor of attitude constraint and response
stability than education (Zaller 1990, 1992; see also Converse 1980; Judd,
Krosnick, and Milburn 1981).
Thus, a variety of evidence suggests that education might not be the most
reliable indicator of the degree to which people truly understand abstract
political concepts. As such, the fact that virtually all of the studies in the
present area of inquiry have relied on education as an index of political
understanding implies that some of the competing hypotheses in this area may
not have been tested as thoroughly and directly as possible. More precisely,
if it is true that educational attainmentisnotthemostaccurateindexofpolitical
understanding, then these studies may not have clearly identiﬁed those re-
spondents who were in the best position to bring purelypoliticalconsiderations
to bear on their racial policy reasoning and recognize the essential contra-
diction between racially motivated thinking and the consensually accepted
principles of the American Creed (cf. Sniderman et al. 1991). Given this
complication, we felt that a reexamination of these predictions—using a more
direct indicator of respondents’ understanding of abstract political con-
cepts—was in order. Moreover, in light of the aforementioned confusion about
whether support for formal equality has truly become consensual, we also
decided to examine the relationships between egalitarianism, racial policy
attitudes, and ideology, with a special focus on the attitudes of sophisticates.Sophistication and Racial Policy Attitudes 151
Overview of the Analyses
In order to address these concerns, we relied on data provided by white
respondents from the 1986 and 1992 American National Election Studies
(NES). Like most of the major NES surveys, the instruments used during
each of these years contained a number of speciﬁc political-knowledge mea-
sures, as well as other items from which additional knowledge measures may
be constructed. Moreover, each survey contained several items measuring
racial prejudice, racial policyattitudes,andvariousrace-neutralpoliticalvalues
(such as conservatism, individualism, and beliefs about government). Using
these measures, we set out to address four primary questions:
1. After the effects of conservatism and other race-neutral political values
are taken into account, does political sophistication attenuate or
strengthen the relationship between racial prejudice and opposition to
afﬁrmative action?
2. Does an advanced understanding of abstract political concepts increase
or decrease the magnitude of the relationship between political con-
servatism and racial prejudice?
3. Is opposition to afﬁrmative action driven by a genuine concern for
equality, and is the strength of the relationship increased as a function
of political sophistication?
4. How consensual a norm is concern for equal opportunity in American
political culture? Is this concern distributed evenly across the political
spectrum? Is it more consensual among the sophisticated?
Data and Measures
As noted above, our data were taken from the 1986 ( ) and 1992 N p 2,176
( ) NES. In 1986, only respondents who received form B of that N p 2,487
year’s survey were asked the necessary battery of racial attitude items. There-
fore, only the white respondents who received this form ( ) were N p 922
included in the analyses. In 1992, all respondents received thenecessaryitems,
so the full sample of white respondents ( ) was used.
2 Items from N p 1,880
2. In 1986, for form B, the response rate was 67.9 percent. In 1992, the response rate for the
preelection survey was 74 percent for respondents included as part of the 1992 NES cross-section
and 77.7 percent for respondents included as part of the 1990–92 NES panel study; thereinterview
rate for the postelection survey was 89.3 percent for respondents included as part of the 1992
NES cross-section, and 85 percent for respondents included as part of the 1990–92 NES panel
study. Also, in the analyses that follow, further reductions in sample size occurred because of
missing data for some variables. Final sample sizes for each analysis are shown in tables 1–4.
It should be noted that most of these additional reductions in sample size were due to missing
values for key variables rather than demographics. For example, the variables with the largest
numbers of missing values were beliefs about government (105 missing) and opposition to
afﬁrmative action (107 missing) in 1986, and evaluative racial superiority (223 missing) and152 Federico and Sidanius
these surveys were used to operationalize ﬁve general clusters of variables:
(1) political sophistication, (2) race-neutral political values, (3) racial preju-
dice, (4) general egalitarianism, and (5) and opposition to afﬁrmative action.
With the exception of the demographic measures described below, all of the
measures described below were recoded to run from zero to one. Further
information on the measures from each survey is provided in the appendix.
political sophistication
Based on research suggesting that accurate political knowledge is the strongest
predictor of “expert” patterns of political cognition and belief organization
(see above; see also Fiske et al. 1990; Zaller1990),weoperationalizedpolitical
sophistication in terms of respondents’ performance on a series of political
knowledge items. In the 1986 NES, 13 indicators were used. Six of these
asked respondents to identify the job or political ofﬁce held by a series of
political ﬁgures, while two additional questions asked respondents whichparty
had the most members in each of the two houses of Congress before the 1986
election. For each of these eight items, respondents were given a score of one
for a correct response and a score of zero for an incorrect response. Five
additional indicators of respondents’ political knowledge were generated by
comparing their placements of ﬁve pairs of “opposed” political ﬁgures and
parties on standard 7-point policy scales (cf. Zaller 1990). In order to be given
a correct score on each pair, respondents had to locate the two groups or
candidates in the correct left–right order and at least two scale units apart.
Correct answers were given a score of one, and incorrect answers were given
a score of zero. In the 1992 NES, 10 indicators were used. Four of these
asked respondents to identify the job or ofﬁce held by a series of political
ﬁgures, while three additional items asked about various factual aspects of
the political system (e.g., who nominates judges to the federal courts, which
branch of government evaluates the constitutionality of laws, which party is
more conservative, etc.). Three more indices were created by comparing re-
spondents’ placements of the two political parties on defense, government
spending, and generalized liberalism–conservatism. Again, respondents had
to place the two parties in the correct left–right order and at least two scale
units apart to be given a correct score. These items were scored just like they
were in 1986.
Once the items were scored, overall measures of political sophistication for
each data set were then generated by adding respondents’ scores on all 13
items in the 1986 NES and all 10 items in the 1992 NES. Both sets of
sophistication measures scaled reliably ( in 1986; in 1992). a p .85 a p .78
beliefs about government (305 missing) in 1992. The only demographic variable with more than
a few missing values was income. However, in both data sets, this variable had fewer missing
values than the variables listed above (i.e., 84 in 1986, 141 in 1992).Sophistication and Racial Policy Attitudes 153
race-neutral political values
Political conservatism. In each data set, a composite index of respondents’
political beliefs was created by averaging respondents’ scores on four different
measures: (1) respondents’ self-placement on a 7-point ideology scale, (2) the
NES summary measure of partisan identiﬁcation, (3) the difference between
respondents’ thermometer ratings of conservatives and liberals, and (4) the
difference between respondents’ thermometer ratings of the Republican Party
and the Democratic Party. Before each scale was created, each item was
rescaled on a zero to one interval. Scores were coded such that higher values
indicated a stronger tilt to the right. Together, the four scores formed reliable
scales in each data set ( in 1986; in 1992). a p .80 a p .85
Beliefs about government. This variable, which measures respondents’level
of support for government intervention in social and economic matters, was
included as a second index of respondents’ political values. In both surveys,
it was measured using a single indicator: the standard 7-point NES fewer-
versus-more government services and spending item. These items were coded
such that higher scores indicated a preference for less government.
Individualism. In the 1986 NES, an additional six-item measure of race-
neutral political values was created using the economic individualism scale
developed by Feldman (1988) and employed in several subsequent studies of
racial attitudes (e.g., Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000). In general, these
items measure the degree to which respondents endorsed beliefs associated
with the Protestant work ethic, such as hard work, self-reliance, and the idea
that one’s social outcomes are primarily a function of individual effort. Each
item was coded such that higher scores indicated a greater endorsement of
individualistic values ( ). This measure was not available in the 1992 a p .60
NES.
measures of racial prejudice
In order to gauge the effects of respondents’ basicracialattitudesonopposition
to afﬁrmative action, we measured prejudice as a sense of white in-group
superiority in both data sets.
3 In the 1986 NES, prejudice was measured in
3. In addition to these indices of prejudice, the various “symbolic racism” and “racialresentment”
measures have been shown to be strong predictors of opposition to afﬁrmative action, over and
above the effects of race-neutral variables (see Sears 1988; see also Kinder and Sanders 1996).
However, advocates of both the politics-centered (e.g., Sniderman and Tetlock 1986) and group-
dominance (e.g., Sidanius et al. 2000) models have noted that the items included in these measures
may confound racialprejudice with race-neutralpoliticalconsiderations(e.g.,individualism,belief
in minimal government, etc.), such that conservatives must inevitably give a “prejudiced” re-
sponse, regardless of their attitudes toward blacks. In light of this problem—and our basic interest
in distinguishing the effects of racial considerations from nonracial ones—we have decided not
to use these measures in the present study. Nevertheless, along with proponents of the symbolic
racism and racial resentment approaches, we acknowledge that the key belief tapped by these
measures—that blacks violate a number of “traditional American values”—is a powerful ante-
cedent of opposition to afﬁrmative action.154 Federico and Sidanius
terms of classical racism. This variable measured the degree to which re-
spondents believed that blacks are “naturally” inferior to whites (see Sidanius
et al. 1996; see also Sears 1988). It was assessed by asking whether respon-
dents believed that black disadvantage was due to either (1) an innate lack
of ability or (2) a “divine” plan. Higher scores indicated greater racism
( ). In the 1992 NES, racial prejudice was indexed in terms of eval- a p .52
uative racial superiority. This index—which measured a slightly less extreme
form of belief in the inferiority of blacks—was created using items that asked
respondents to rate whites and blacks on three 7-point trait dimensions, each
of which had a positive and a negative pole: (1) violent/not-violent, (2) un-
intelligent/intelligent, and (3) lazy/hard-working. Each item was coded such
that higher scores indicated more positive ratings. A difference score for each
trait was then created by subtracting ratings of blacks from ratings of whites.
These three difference scores were then averaged to form a single index
() . a p .74
general egalitarianism
This variable, which measured respondents’ support for egalitarian social
values and arrangements, was indexed in both data sets using the six items
from the NES egalitarianism scale developed by Feldman (1988). Higher
scores indicated a greater level of egalitarianism ( in 1986; a p .74 a p
in 1992). .75
opposition to afﬁrmative action
In each data set, opposition to afﬁrmative action programs was indexed using
two items asking respondents to indicate their feelings about (1) preferential
hiring and promotion for blacks and (2) the use of racial quotas in college
admissions. Both items were coded such that higher scores indicated greater
opposition to afﬁrmative action ( in 1986; in 1992). a p .75 a p .69
demographics
Finally, in each data set, ﬁve demographic variables typically related to white
racial attitudes were also considered (Sears et al. 1997): age, gender, income,
completion of a college degree, and a dummy variable indicating whether the
respondent lived in a southern or non-southern state. In addition to providing
a control for a variable known to affect racial attitudes, the inclusion of the
college-degree variable in the models also allowed us to distinguish the “con-
straining” effects of sophistication from the somewhat-related effects of
schooling (Bishop 1976; Converse 1980; Fiske et al. 1990). Since the com-
pletion of a higher degree is the educational experience most commonlylinked
to liberalized racial attitudes (see Sniderman et al. 1991; Steinberg and Selz-Sophistication and Racial Policy Attitudes 155
nick 1969), we decided thatitwould bethemostappropriatewayofcontrolling
for said effects.
Analysis and Results
prejudice, race-neutral values, and afﬁrmative action:
effects of political sophistication
As noted earlier, a number of researchers have argued that the policy reasoning
of whites who are better able to understand the ideas that animate political
life—as well as the essentially egalitarian norms of American political cul-
ture—will be driven more heavily by abstract ideological considerations,
thereby lessening the effects of racism on opinions about policies like afﬁr-
mative action. In contrast, others have suggested that whites with a better
understanding of politics will be more likely to see how redistributive racial
policies work against the material and symbolic interests of their group,
thereby strengthening rather than weakening the relationship between racism
and attitudes toward afﬁrmative action.
In order to examine these predictions, we regressedoppositiontoafﬁrmative
action on racial prejudice and several race-neutral political values among
subsamples of whites who were low and high in political sophistication in
each data set. In the 1986 NES, classical racism was used as the measure of
racial prejudice, while conservatism, beliefs about government, and individ-
ualism served as the race-neutral controls. In the 1992 NES, the evaluative
racial superiority measure was used, with conservatism and beliefs about
government serving as the controls. In order to better distinguish whites with
low and high levels of political sophistication, we trichotomized the sample
on the basis of their political knowledge scores and used only the respondents
in the bottom (low sophistication; in 1986; in 1992) and N p 316 N p 687
top (high sophistication; in 1986; in 1992) thirds of the N p 328 N p 608
sophistication distribution. In both data sets, opposition to afﬁrmative action
was then regressed separately on the attitude measures and demographics in
each sophistication group. In order to determine whether any differences in
the predictive power of our independent variables across these two levels of
sophistication represented a reliable trend in each of the overall samples and
to ensure that their scope was not restricted to any particular segment of the
sophistication continuum, the b-coefﬁcients for the interactions between each
attitude and sophistication were examined in additional analyses, which used
all of the respondents from each data set (and not merely those from the
bottom and top thirds of the sophistication distribution).
For the 1986 NES, the results of this analysis are shown in the top panel
of table 1. Looking ﬁrst at the coefﬁcients for political conservatism, we ﬁnd
a result consistent with the notion that sophistication may facilitate the use156 Federico and Sidanius
Table 1. Opposition to Afﬁrmative Action Regressed on Racial and Race-
Neutral Predictors at Low and High Levels of Political Sophistication (1986
and 1992 NES)
Variable







B SE BB SE BBSE B
1986 NES:
Political
conservatism .11 .05 (.17) .59*** .39*** (.10) .69** (.26)
Individualism .14 .23
 (.13) .55*** .27* (.12) .09 (.25)
Beliefs about gov’t .02 .05 (.08) .34*** .03 (.08) .06 (.16)
Classical racism .23*** .25*** (.08) .39*** .27** (.09) .81*** (.15)
Adjusted R
2 (%) 7.0 27.3 13.1
N 209 222 694
1992 NES:
Political
conservatism .03 .004 (.11) .45*** .33*** (.05) .65*** (.15)
Beliefs about gov’t .02 .01 (.05) .32*** .09* (.05) .11 (.10)
Evaluative racial
superiority .28*** .17
 (.09) .53*** .29*** (.08) .44** (.18)
Adjusted R
2 (%) 4.0 25.1 13.0
N 318 538 1,317
Note.—Multivariate entries for low- and high-sophistication groups are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients, taken from
models containing all attitudes and age, gender, income, completion of a college degree, and region. Interaction statistics are
from models containing all three interactions, the main effects, and the demographics, using the full sample of whites.
 p ! .10, two-tailed.
* p !. 05, two-tailed.
** p ! .01, two-tailed.
*** p ! .001, two-tailed.
of race-neutral concepts in policy reasoning: even after the effects of racism,
beliefs about government, and individualism were considered, the relationship
between conservatism and opposition to afﬁrmative action was positive and
highly signiﬁcant among whites with a better knowledge of politics, but non-
signiﬁcant among whites with a less sophisticated knowledge of politics.
Examining the tests shown in the last column of table 1, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
interaction between conservatism and sophistication ( , ), sug- b p .69 p ! .01
gesting that the difference between the coefﬁcients in the low- and high-
sophistication groups represents a signiﬁcant trend in the overall sample. In
contrast, the results for our other race-neutral predictors were less supportive
of this basic prediction. Controlling for the effects of conservatism andracism,
the relationship between individualism and opposition to afﬁrmative action
was only slightly stronger among experts than it was among the less sophis-
ticated; the associated interaction between individualism and sophistication in
the full sample was nonsigniﬁcant as well ( , ). Moreover, b p .09 p 1 .10
net of the other variables’ effects, beliefs about government were not related
to afﬁrmative action attitudes in either group (both ; the interaction p’s 1 .10
was also nonsigniﬁcant, ). p 1 .10Sophistication and Racial Policy Attitudes 157
The results involving classical racism painted a somewhat different picture.
Contrary to the notion that a sophisticated understanding of politics should
attenuate the impact of prejudice, higher levels of classical racism were as-
sociated with greater opposition to afﬁrmative action among whites with a
strong understanding of politics ( , ), even after the effects of b p .27 p ! .01
the two race-neutral predictors were accounted for. In fact, opposition to
afﬁrmative action among our less sophisticated respondents, rather than being
more heavily driven by prejudicial considerations, appeared to be associated
with lower racism scores ( , ), suggesting that whites with b p .25 p ! .001
a poor understanding of politics are not even able to connect a belief in the
inferiority of blacks with opposition to afﬁrmative action in an “appropriate,”
instrumentally rational fashion. Moreover, in contrast to what we found with
regard to most of the race-neutral measures, the interaction between racism
and sophistication in the full sample was highly signiﬁcant ( , b p .81 p !
), suggesting that the difference between these two coefﬁcients represents .001
a reliable trend.
4
The analyses using the 1992 NES produced similar results, which areshown
in the bottom panel of table 1. We again found that the effects of conservatism
and beliefs about government were stronger at high levels of sophistication
than at low levels of sophistication; however, only conservatism interacted
signiﬁcantly with sophistication in the overall sample ( ). However, p ! .001
the results for the evaluative racial superiority measure were largely consistent
with the argument that sophistication may actually boost the effects of racism.
Even after the effects of conservatism and beliefs about government were
accounted for, the evaluative racial superiority measure was more strongly
and positively related to afﬁrmative action opposition in the high-sophisti-
cation group ( , ) than in the low-sophistication group ( b p .29 p ! .001 b p
, ). As the tests in the ﬁnal column of table 1 show, this variable .17 p ! .10
4. This is not the ﬁrst time this somewhat counterintuitive negative correlation between classical
racism and opposition to government help for blacks has been observed. In a sample of Bay
Area respondents, it was found that those who felt blacks had been made inferior by God were
also relatively supportive of government policy to aid blacks (see Apostle et al. 1983). This
counterintuitive ﬁnding can be understood in attributional terms. That is, if blacks have been
created inferior by God, they bear no direct responsibility for their plight and are therefore to
be pitied rather than punished (Weiner 1986). An alternate possibility is that this result is due
to acquiescence bias. Since both the racism and afﬁrmative action scales consist of agree-disagree
and favor-oppose items worded in the same direction, there may have been a tendency to agree
with the racist sentiments in the racism items and favor the afﬁrmative action programs, especially
among nonsophisticates. To deal with this, we created an acquiescence scale by looking at
responses to the eight “traditional values” items (a balanced set of items, with four coded in the
“agree” direction and four coded in the “disagree” direction; 1986 NES items v525–v532) and
counting the number of items to which a respondent gave “agree strongly” or “agree somewhat”
responses (Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000). Corrected racism and afﬁrmative action scales
were then created by regressing the items in each scale on acquiescence, obtaining residual
scores, and then recalculating the scale values for each measure using these residuals. When the
analysis was rerun using these corrected scales, the results were identical, suggesting that our
ﬁndings were not methodological artifacts.158 Federico and Sidanius
interacted signiﬁcantly with sophistication in the overall sample (both p’s !
), suggesting a reliable trend toward a stronger relationship between racial .01
prejudice and afﬁrmative action opposition among respondents who best un-
derstand politics.
5
On the whole, then, these results provide little support for the hypothesis
that the policy attitudes of whites with higher levels of political understanding
would be less related to prejudice. On the one hand, the policy preferences
of whites with high levels of political sophistication wereindeedmorestrongly
related to conservatism, although this was not consistently thecasewithbeliefs
about government and individualism. On the other hand, contrary to this basic
hypothesis, opposition to afﬁrmative action was also more heavily driven by
attitudes of racial superiority among experts independent of the effects of the
race-neutral predictors.
6
5. While these results are interesting in their own regard, they leave open the possibility that
the interactions between racism and sophistication in each data set may be driven mainly by a
relationship between sophistication and decreased opposition to afﬁrmative action among those
low in racism, without being accompanied by an additional relationship between sophistication
and increased opposition to afﬁrmative action among those high in racism. In order to check on
this possibility, we regressed opposition to afﬁrmative action on sophistication in the least and
most racist thirds of each sample. Among whites low in racism ( in 1986; in N p 216 N p 340
1992), we found that sophistication was associated with decreased opposition to afﬁrmativeaction
in the 1986 NES ( , ) and completely unrelated to afﬁrmative action attitudes in b p .26 p ! .01
the 1992 NES ( , ). However, among whites high in racism ( in 1986; b p .06 p 1 .10 N p 320
in 1992), we found that sophistication was associated with increased opposition to N p 368
afﬁrmative action in both datasets ( , in 1986; , in 1992). As such, b p .19 p ! .01 b p .14 p ! .01
it would seem that a sophisticated understanding of politics strengthens the relationship between
racism and opposition to afﬁrmative action not merely by reducing opposition among those who
are not racist but also by boosting opposition among those who are.
6. Despite its insistence that racism and variables like conservatism and opposition to afﬁrmative
action should be intrinsically related to one another, the group dominance model also suggests
that the nature of this relationship will depend on which aspects of the general construct of
“racism” one focuses on (see Sidanius et al. 1996). While many researchers have deﬁned racial
prejudice strictly in terms of anti-black affect (e.g., Sniderman and Piazza 1993), it is clear that
prejudice has an additional and perhaps more important component, i.e., the idea that subordinate
groups are inherently inferior to dominant groups (i.e., “classical racism”; see Sidanius et al.
1996). Although these two aspects of prejudice are clearly related, they are far from identical.
In this vein, several theorists (e.g., Jackman 1994; van den Berghe 1967) have noted that a belief
in the inferiority of a given outgroup—and desires for group dominance—need not be accom-
panied by negative affect toward that group (as in the antebellum South; see van den Berghe
1967; see also Sidanius and Pratto 1999). However, despite historical variance in the role of
affect in prejudice, the idea of black inferiority has remained a constant element in white racial
attitudes for most of American history. Consistent with this reasoning, we have relied on measures
rooted in superiority/inferiority beliefs. Nevertheless, one might argue that the use of measures
like these prevents our analysis from truly addressing existing politics-centered work on the role
of political understanding in racial attitudes, which implies that a healthy awareness of abstract
political ideas and mainstream political norms should mainly reduce the inﬂuence of affect on
policy attitudes (see Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). However, when we substituted anti-
black affect (item v149 in the 1986 NES, item v5323 in the 1992 NES) for the prejudice measure
in each data set, we still did not ﬁnd that the net effect of anti-black affect was smaller in the
high-sophistication groups. In the 1986 NES, its effect was the same in both groups ( , b p .20
both ), while its effect actually increased slightly in the 1992 NES (i.e., , p’s ! .05 b p .21 p !
, in the low-sophistication group, vs. , , in the high-sophistication group). .01 b p .30 p ! .001
Moreover, when anti-black affect was added to the full 1986 and 1992 models shown in tableSophistication and Racial Policy Attitudes 159
the relationship between political conservatism and
racial prejudice
Consistent with the argument that most Americans have internalized the mes-
sage of the civil rights movement and accepted racial equality as one of the
assumptions of the American Creed, research suggesting that education and
political sophistication may weaken the effects of prejudice also implies that
political conservatism and prejudice will be linked only among whites who
do not truly understand the color-blind nature of conservative values, that is,
political novices (see Sniderman et al. 1991; see also McClosky and Zaller
1984). In contrast, consistent with the argument that racism and conservatism
may share a common root—namely, a desire for unequal relationships among
groups—others have suggested that they should be more strongly related
among whites who truly understand the implications of various political ideas
(e.g., Sidanius et al. 2000).
In order to examine these predictions, we regressed conservatism on the
racial prejudice measures from 1986 and 1992 and the demographics among
whites who were low and high in political sophistication in each data set.
Once again, we used only respondents from the bottom and top thirds of the
knowledge continuum in each survey, and full-sample interaction tests similar
to those reported above were used to determine whether any differences in
the predictive power of each racism measure across these two groups were
reliable.
For the 1986 NES, the results of this analysis are shown in the top row of
table 2. Here, conservatism was regressed on classical racism at high and low
levels of sophistication. Looking ﬁrst at the coefﬁcients for this relationship,
we once again obtain a result at odds with the notion that the beliefs of
sophisticated whites should be less contaminated by prejudice. While this
relationship was signiﬁcant and positive in the high-sophistication group, it
failed to reach signiﬁcance in the low-sophistication group. The test on the
interaction between racism and sophistication in the full sample produced a
signiﬁcant result ( , ), suggesting a reliable trend. A parallel b p .24 p ! .01
analysis using the 1992 NES produced similar results, shown in the bottom
row of table 2. Looking at these coefﬁcients, we can see that the relationship
between evaluative racial superiority and conservatism was signiﬁcant and
positive in the high-sophistication group, but nonsigniﬁcant in the low-so-
phistication group. Moreover, the signiﬁcance of this result is reinforced by
the presence of a reliable interaction between evaluative superiority and so-
phistication in the full sample ( , ). b p .63 p ! .001
Thus, our analyses of the relationship between racism and conservatism
among groups of whites differing in political sophistication were not sup-
1 (i.e., in addition to the measures of race-neutral values and prejudice), it did not alter the effects
of our prejudice measures in either data set. Thus, our results are not likely to be due to a failure
to consider the affective variables emphasized in some versions of the politics-centered approach.160 Federico and Sidanius
Table 2. Relationship between Political Conservatism and Racial Prejudice
at Low and High Levels of Political Sophistication (1986 and 1992 NES)
Predictor of
Conservatism







B SE BB SE BBSE B
1986 NES:
Classical racism .03 .02 (.03) .23*** .18** (.07) .24** (.09)
N 276 242 813
1992 NES:
Evaluative racial
superiority .05 .05 (.04) .30*** .33*** (.08) .63*** (.13)
N 458 560 1,547
Note.—Multivariate entries for low- and high-sophistication groups are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients, taken from
models containing racial attitudes and age, gender, income, completion of a college degree, and region. Interaction statistics are
taken from models using the full sample of whites from each data set.
 p ! .10, two-tailed.
* p ! .05, two-tailed.
** p ! .01, two-tailed.
*** p ! .001, two-tailed.
portive of the idea that a better understanding of political ideas and the norms
of mainstream political culture would weaken the relationship between prej-
udice and ideology. Contrary to this notion, conservatism was more strongly
associated with racism among sophisticated whites.
7
egalitarianism and opposition to afﬁrmative action
Analyses suggesting a genuinely reduced role for prejudice in whites’ racial
policy attitudes have also implied that a distaste for equality is no longer an
important antecedent of opposition to such policies and that a commitment
to certain types of equality may in fact drive whites’ opposition to afﬁrmative
action, particularly among those with a sophisticated understanding ofpolitics.
That is, whites who oppose afﬁrmative action may do so out of a belief that
the policy is itself discriminatory and contrary to the formally egalitarian
norms of the American Creed, providing certain groups with an unfair ad-
7. Again, in order to test our hypotheses using the feeling-thermometer measures emphasized
by the politics-centered approach, we repeated the analyses in this section using anti-black affect
instead of the prejudice measures. However, in both data sets, anti-black affect was not related
to conservatism in either sophistication group (all ). Moreover, when anti-black affect p’s 1 .10
was added to the analyses reported in table 2 as an additional control, it did not change the
results involving the prejudice measures: as before, prejudice was unrelated to conservatism
among those low in sophistication ( in 1986 ; in 1992; both ) but b p .03 b p .07 p’s 1 .10
positively associated with conservatism among sophisticates ( , in 1986; b p .17 p ! .05 b p
, in 1992). Thus, these results reinforce the notion that political attitudes will be only .31 p ! .01
weakly related to racism when the latter is deﬁned strictly in terms of racial animus or anti-
black affect, and they also suggest that the effect of racism on ideology is relatively independent
of the effect of group affect (see Sidanius et al. 1996).Sophistication and Racial Policy Attitudes 161
vantage in hiring, school admissions, and the like (Sniderman and Carmines
1997; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997; see also Connerly 1996). As Sni-
derman and Piazza (1993) have argued, “Though there are elements of the
Creed that can be deployed in favor of afﬁrmative action, the fundamental
ideas of fairness and equal treatment, for most ordinary citizens, thrust in
exactly the opposite direction. What gives the race-conscious agenda its dis-
tinctive character, what makes the agenda open to challenge morally, is that
the principle of preferential treatment runs against the Creed” (p. 177). Thus,
this approach suggests that opposition to afﬁrmative action may be positively
related to egalitarian sentiment, and—at any rate—that it should not be sig-
niﬁcantly driven by antiegalitarianism in the present social and historical
context, at least among those who clearly understand the norms of American
political culture. In contrast, other researchers maintain that whites’opposition
to afﬁrmative action still stems in part from a desire to protect their group’s
privileged position in the racial hierarchy (Sidanius et al. 2000). As such, one
should ﬁnd that antiegalitarian whites are most opposed to afﬁrmative action.
Moreover, this should particularly be the case among whites who have a better
understanding of political ideas.
In other words, there appears to be a basic disagreement about the role of
egalitarian values in the genesis of whites’ racial policy attitudes, particularly
with regard to sophisticates. Nevertheless, the arguments at the heart of this
disagreement have not been subjected to a great deal of empirical scrutiny
(but see Sidanius et al. 2000). In order to shed some light on this problem,
we ﬁrst of all regressed opposition to afﬁrmative action on general egalitar-
ianism and the demographic controls among all of the whites in each data
set. Since the items in this measure cover several aspects of people’s beliefs
about equality—including support for equal opportunity, fears that outcomes
have become too unequal in American society, and the general importance
of equality as a social value (see Feldman 1988)—this analysis allowed us
to get a broad look at the relationship between egalitarianism and racial policy
attitudes. Contrary to the suggestion that opposition to afﬁrmative action may
have egalitarian roots, we found that a preference for equality was negatively
related to afﬁrmative action opposition in 1986 ( , ) and b p .32 p ! .001
1992 ( , ), net of the effects of the demographic controls. b p .38 p ! .001
Despite the strength of these results, a possible objection to this analysis
involves our broad operational deﬁnition of egalitarianism. In discussion of
the role played by egalitarian beliefsinwhites’oppositiontoafﬁrmativeaction,
a number of theorists have been careful to point out that the equality whites
are most likely to have in mind when making such judgments is equality of
opportunity—that is, equal treatment and an equal chance to succeed, rather
than equal “results” in the game of life (see Sniderman and Carmines 1997;
see also Pole 1993; Rae 1981). Since our measure of egalitarianism contained
items measuring support for both types of equality, the analysis described
above may have provided a less than optimal test of the question at hand.162 Federico and Sidanius
Therefore, we repeated the analysis, this time using a modiﬁed egalitarianism
scale based only on the three items from the NES egalitarianism that have
been speciﬁcally identiﬁed as measures of support for equality of opportunity
(i.e., the so-called more equal treatment items; see Sears, Henry, and Kos-
terman 2000).
8 However, like general egalitarianism, endorsement of these
equal opportunity items was also negatively related to afﬁrmative action op-
position in both the 1986 NES ( , ) and the 1992 NES b p .24 p ! .001
(, ) . b p .25 p ! .001
While these results are instructive, they do not get at a key issue—the
suggestion that opposition to afﬁrmative action should be a matter of outright
antiegalitarianism primarily among those who lack the political knowledge
necessary for a genuine understanding of the values at the heart of the
American Creed. In order to examine this possibility, we repeated the above
analyses separately for respondents at low and high levels of political so-
phistication in each data set. As before, we restricted the analysis to re-
spondents in the bottom and top thirds of the political knowledgedistribution
for illustrative purposes. Full-sample interaction tests similar to those re-
ported earlier were used to determine whether differencesin therelationships
between our egalitarianism measures and afﬁrmative action opposition
across these two groups represented a reliable trend. The results of these
analyses are displayed in table 3. Looking ﬁrst at the results for 1986 NES,
shown in the top panel of this table, we can see that afﬁrmative action
attitudes were essentially unrelated to general egalitarianism among whites
with a poor understanding of politics. However, contrary to the hypothesis
that sophistication may dampen the effects of antiegalitarian sentiment,egal-
itarianism had a strongly negative relationship with opposition to afﬁrmative
action among sophisticated whites. Moreover, this difference was accom-
panied by a highly signiﬁcant interaction between egalitarianism and so-
phistication in the full sample ( , ). Similarly, support for b p .77 p ! .001
equal opportunity was unrelated to afﬁrmativeactionoppositionamongthose
low in sophistication, but negatively related to afﬁrmative action opposition
among respondents high in sophistication—a result that was again reinforced
by the presence of a statistically reliable interaction between equal oppor-
tunity and sophistication in the overall sample ( , ). The b p .37 p ! .05
analyses using the 1992 NES produced an analogous patternofresults,which
8. In 1986, these items were v364, v366, and v369; in 1992, they were v6024, v6028, and
v6029. The reliabilities for these equality of opportunity scales were (in the 1986 NES) a p .61
and (in the 1992 NES). Note that these items are agree-disagree items, all worded in a p .65
the same direction. Since the afﬁrmative action items also had a favor-oppose format, this again
raises the possibility of acquiescence bias. In order to deal with this, we corrected each scale
for acquiescence in the same manner as before (see n. 4 above). In the 1986 NES, this was done
using the same acquiescence scale described earlier. In the 1992 NES, it was done using a similar
scale based on four of the “traditional values” items (two were coded in the “agree” direction,
and two in the “disagree” direction; see 1992 NES items v6115, v6116, v6118, and v6119).
Analyses using these corrected scales produced results identical to those reported in this section.Table 3. Opposition to Afﬁrmative Action Regressed on General Egalitarianism (Model 1) and Support for Equality of Op-
portunity (Model 2) at Low and High Levels of Political Sophistication (1986 NES and 1992 NES)







B SE BB SE BB SE B
1986 NES:
Model 1: General egalitarianism .08 .01 (.12) .55*** .50*** (.07) .77*** (.19)
Model 2: Equality of opportunity .16
 .11 (.09) .41*** .37*** (.08) .37* (.18)
N (both models) 251 234 764
1992 NES:
Model 1: General egalitarianism .17
 .22** (.09) .63*** .55*** (.05) .74*** (.13)
Model 2: Equality of opportunity .22*** .21*** (.06) .38*** .35*** (.04) .23* (.11)
N (both models) 470 578 1,586
Note.—Entries for low- and high-sophistication groups in the “With Demographics” columns are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients, taken from models containing the indicated attitude and age, gender, income,
completion of a college degree, and region; the effects of each equality index were tested in separate models. Interaction statistics are from models also containing the demographics and the main effects for the attitude
and political sophistication, using the full sample of whites from each data set. Each row represents a separate model.
 p ! .10, two-tailed.
* p ! .05, two-tailed.
** p ! .01, two-tailed.
*** p ! .001, two-tailed.164 Federico and Sidanius
are shown in the bottom panel of table 3. While the relationship between
general egalitarianism and afﬁrmative action opposition was signiﬁcant in
both sophistication groups, it was much larger among those with high so-
phistication, a difference that was again associated with a highly signiﬁcant
interaction between egalitarianism and sophistication in the overall sample
( , ). Similarly, the relationship between support for equal b p .74 p ! .001
opportunity and opposition to afﬁrmative action was signiﬁcant in both
sophistication groups, but somewhat larger in the high-sophistication group.
The interaction between equal opportunity and sophistication was signiﬁcant
in the overall sample as well ( , ), suggesting that the dif- b p .23 p ! .05
ference between the above coefﬁcients was reliable.
how consensual a norm is equality of opportunity?
In the next set of analyses, we examined the assumption that support for
formal equality—that is, equality of opportunity—is a fairly consensual norm
in American political culture. In this vein, work suggesting a reduced role for
prejudice in contemporary white racial policy attitudes implies that one of
the long-term effects of the civil rights movement was to bring about a general
consensus in favor of equal opportunity. Indeed, when we looked at responses
to the three items in the equal opportunity scales from each data set, we found
that most people gave responses in favor of equal opportunity: across the
three items in each data set, an average of 64 percent of the respondents in
the 1986 NES and 73 percent of the respondents in the 1992 NES either
“agreed strongly” or “agreed somewhat” with theitems’pro-equal-opportunity
sentiments. However, it may be that this general pattern of concern for equal
opportunity, while stronger than in the past, is still not evenly distributed
across the ideological spectrum, particularly among those who understand the
implications of their beliefs for the maintenance of group hierarchies.
In order to examine this possibility, we ﬁrst of all regressed the equal
opportunity measure from the previous set of analyses on conservatism and
the demographics in each data set.
9 All of the white respondents from each
survey were used in these regressions. The results of this analysis showed
that conservatism was negatively related to support for equal opportunity in
both data sets ( in 1986; in 1992; both ), net b p .32 b p .35 p’s ! .001
of the demographics. However, since we have alreadyshownthatconservatism
is linked to various forms of racial prejudice, it is possible that a portion of
the negative relationship between conservatism and concern for equal op-
portunity may be due to a shared relationship with racism. Thus, we repeated
the above analysis, this time including the prejudice measures from each data
9. The analyses described in this section were also run a second time using the acquiescence-
corrected measures of equal opportunity (in 1986 and 1992) and racism (in 1986) discussed in
nn. 3 and 7 above. These analyses again produced identical results, suggesting that our ﬁndings
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Table 4. Support for Equality of Opportunity Regressed on Political Con-
servatism Alone (Model 1) and with Racial Controls (Model 2) at Low and
High Levels of Political Sophistication (1986 and 1992 NES)
Model







B SE BB SE BBSE B
1986 NES:
Model 1:
Political conservatism .14 .06 (.10) .54*** .56*** (.06) .60*** (.16)
Adjusted R
2 (%) 1.7 25.6 9.3
N 276 242 837
Model 2:
Political conservatism … .08 (.10) … .53*** (.06) .56*** (.16)
Classical racism .12** .10* (.05) .17* .05 (.07) .38*** (.11)
Adjusted R
2 (%) 2.3 24.7 10.7
N 276 242 813
1992 NES:
Model 1:
Political conservatism .15* .19** (.07) .46*** .45*** (.04) .52** (.11)
Adjusted R
2 (%) 3.4 25.5 14.5
N 457 560 1,600
Model 2:
Political conservatism … .19** (.07) … .45*** (.04) .50*** (.11)
Evaluative racial
superiority .06 .04 (.06) .27*** .14* (.07) .20** (.13)
Adjusted R
2 (%) 3.4 25.9 15.1
N 457 560 1,546
Note.—Multivariate entries for low- and high-sophistication groups are unstandardized regression coefﬁcients, taken from
models containing all attitudes and age, gender, income, completion of a college degree, and region. Interaction statistics are
from models containing the demographics and the main effects for all attitudes and political sophistication, using the full sample
of whites from each data set.
 p ! .10, two-tailed.
* p ! .05, two-tailed.
** p ! .01, two-tailed.
*** p ! .001, two-tailed.
set as controls. The results of this analysis showed that conservatism was still
negatively related to support for equal opportunity in both data sets (b p
in 1986; in 1992; both ), even after the effects of .32 b p .34 p’s ! .001
classical racism (in the 1986 NES) and evaluative racial superiority (in the
1992 NES) were taken into account. As such, these resultssuggestthatconcern
for equal opportunity is not evenly distributed across the political spectrum,
despite perhaps being stronger and more well diffused than in the past.
However, the key issue of whether this relationship differs across sophis-
tication levels still remains. In order to address this question, we regressed
the equal opportunity measure on conservatism at low and high levels of
political sophistication in each data set. As before, only respondents in the
bottom and top thirds of the sophistication distribution were included in the
analyses for each data set, although full-sample interaction tests were again166 Federico and Sidanius
used to examine any differences that emerged. For the 1986 NES, the results
of this analysis are shown in the top panel of table 4. As a ﬁrst step, we
regressed equality of opportunity on conservatism alone in the low- and high-
sophistication groups (model 1). Here, we ﬁnd that conservatism and attitudes
toward equal opportunity were essentially unrelated among whites with low
levels of political sophistication, but strongly negatively related among those
high in sophistication. Consistent with this pattern, the interaction between
conservatism and sophistication in the overall sample was signiﬁcant (b p
, ). Moreover, when we repeated this analysis with racism in the .60 p ! .001
model as a control, this basic result remained the same (see model 2). The
analyses using the 1992 NES produced similar results, which are shown in
the bottom panel of table 4. When equal opportunity was regressed on con-
servatism and the demographics alone (model 1), we found that conservatism
and concern for equal opportunity were negatively related in both the low-
and high-sophistication groups, although the relationship was twice as strong
among those high in sophistication. Consistent with this general pattern, the
interaction between conservatism and sophistication in the full sample of
whites was signiﬁcant ( , ). In order to ensure that this re- b p .52 p ! .001
lationship was not due to the confounding effects of racism, we once again
repeated this analysis, this time controlling for the effects of evaluative racial
superiority. As before, this did not change the overall pattern of ﬁndings (see
model 2).
10
On the whole, then, these results suggest that concern for equal opportunity
is not necessarily a politically consensual norm. Rather than being orthogonal
to beliefs about equal opportunity, conservatism was associated with weaker
support for equal opportunity norms in our two samples. Moreover, instead
of diminishing this negative relationship, political sophistication appeared to
10. Breaking these interactions down slightly differently, we also ﬁnd that sophistication has a
different relationship with concern for formal equality among liberals and conservatives
(McClosky and Zaller 1984; Zaller 1992). In the most liberal third of each sample ( in N p 269
1986; in 1992), we ﬁnd that sophistication is associated with increased concern for N p 349
equal opportunity ( in 1986; in 1992; both ). However, in the most b p .18 b p .10 p’s ! .01
conservative third of each sample ( in 1986; in 1992), we ﬁnd that sophis- N p 305 N p 329
tication is associated with decreased concern for equal opportunity ( , in 1986; b p .13 p ! .05
, in 1992). Moreover, net of the demographics in each full sample, we found b p .20 p ! .001
virtually no relationship between sophistication and concern for equal opportunity (i.e., b p
, in 1986; , in 1992). Similarly, we actually found more variance .03 p 1 .10 b p .05 p p .08
in equal opportunity scores among the sophisticated than among the unsophisticated (i.e., .93
vs. .72 in 1986; .79 vs. .62 in 1992); both of these differences were signiﬁcant, as indicated by
Bartlett’s test for homogeneity of variances (both ). If there were general consensus in p’s ! .05
the political culture about equal opportunity, we would expect both stronger relationships between
sophistication and equal opportunity and less variance in the high-sophistication group, indicating
that individuals who were generally more aware of elite norms were also generally more sup-
portive of equal opportunity and less likely to differ among themselves in their opinions about
it. Instead, what we appear to have is a situation where sophistication polarizes attitudes toward
equal opportunity on the basis of respondents’ prior beliefs, resulting in greater variance in equal
opportunity beliefs among sophisticates, consistent with the pattern one would expect given elite
disagreement on an issue (see McClosky and Zaller 1984).Sophistication and Racial Policy Attitudes 167
increase its magnitude, suggesting that conservatives who best understand
their beliefs—and the norms of American political culture—are even less
likely to be concerned about equality of opportunity. In fact, the only re-
spondents for whom ideology and concern for formal equality wereorthogonal
were our novices, who should be less likely than other individuals to truly
understand the implications of the beliefs they espouse. So, while we have
no reason to believe that equal opportunity is not endorsed by mostAmericans,
the present ﬁndings lead us to also conclude that it is not uniformly endorsed
across the political spectrum.
knowledge and education as moderators of key
relationships
Finally, one of the key implications of the perspective advanced here is that
knowledge should be a better indicator of political understanding than edu-
cation. If this is the case, then we should also ﬁnd that it has stronger effects
on the magnitude of the key relationships examined in the earlier sections.
In order to conﬁrm this, we looked at the degree to which each variable
moderated the relationships indicated in table 5. Two new sets of interaction
analyses, parallel to those reported in tables 1–4, were conducted: one that
tested the interactions between each predictor and years of education alone,
and another that simultaneously tested the interactions between each predictor
and education and the interactions between each predictor and knowledge.
For comparative purposes, the interaction results for knowledge alone, taken
from the tables 1–4, are reported in the knowledge columns labeled “Tested
Separately.” The results of these analyses are summarized by the totals at the
bottom of each column. Looking ﬁrst at the analyses in which the moderating
effects of knowledge and education were examined separately, we can see
that knowledge moderated a greater number of relationships in each data set
(i.e., 6 vs. 3, with one additional marginal interaction with education in 1986;
6 vs. 4 in 1992). This pattern becomes even clearer when we look at the
results of the analyses that examined the effects of both moderators simul-
taneously. In 1986, knowledge moderated ﬁve of the relationships, while
education moderated only one. Similarly, in 1992, knowledge moderated four
of the key relationships, while education moderated only two of them. More-
over, in 1986, the results of the simultaneous tests also indicated that there
were ﬁve cases in which knowledge alone moderated a key relationship,while
there was only one case in which education alone moderated a relationship.
Analogously, in 1992, there were three cases in which knowledge alone fully
or marginally moderated key relationships, but none in which education alone
had a moderating effect. Thus, these results provide suggestive evidence for
the idea that knowledge may be a better indicator of political understand-
ing—and its effects on relationships between attitudes—than education.168 Federico and Sidanius
Table 5. Sophistication and Education as Moderators of Key Relationships









Knowl. Educ. Knowl. Educ. Knowl. Educ. Knowl. Educ.
From table 1:
AA and conservatism ** * * n.s. *** *** ** **
AA and individualism n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. … … … …
AA and government n.s.
 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
AA and classical racism *** * *** n.s. … … … …




racism ** * n.s. * … … … …
Conservatism and evaluative
superiority … … … … *** n.s. *** n.s.
From table 3:
AA and general
egalitarianism *** n.s. *** n.s. *** *** ** ***




conservatism *** n.s. *** n.s. *** n.s. *** n.s.
Number of fully signiﬁcant
interactions 6 3 5 1 6 4 4 2
Note.—Entries indicate the signiﬁcance of the interaction between the variable in each row and the moderator (knowledge
or education) shown at the top of each column. The “Tested Separately” entries for the knowledge interactions are taken from
the tests shown in tables 1–4. All analyses were multivariate.
 p ! .10, two-tailed.
* p ! .05, two-tailed.
** p ! .01, two-tailed.
*** p ! .001, two-tailed.
Summary and Discussion
As we noted earlier, the hypothesis that a better understanding of abstract
political concepts and the basic norms of American political culture should
weaken the relationship between racism and policy attitudes and produce a
more consensual pattern of support for equal opportunity among whites has
received an increasing amount of empirical attention (e.g., Sidanius et al.
1996, 2000; see also Sniderman et al. 1991). Nevertheless, the results of these
studies are subject to criticism with regard to the manner in which they have
operationalized individuals’ understanding of political concepts and main-
stream political norms. Most of these studies have relied on education as their
primary index of political understanding (see Sidanius et al. 1996, 2000; for
similar approaches, see Jackman and Muha 1984). While education certainly
has implicationsfor one’slevelofpoliticalsophistication,recentworksuggests
that it may not adequately capture the construct of political understanding, at
either a conceptual or an empirical level (Fiske et al. 1990; Zaller 1990). AsSophistication and Racial Policy Attitudes 169
such, previous studies may not have provided an adequate examination of the
hypothesis that an awareness of political ideas and mainstream politicalnorms
may attenuate the impact of prejudice and antiegalitarianism. Therefore, in
an effort to address this problem, we have deﬁned political sophistication in
terms of actual political knowledge in the present study. Using this index in
two different national probability samples, we examined the relationships
between afﬁrmative action attitudes, prejudice, race-neutral political consid-
erations, and beliefs about equality among white respondents with different
levels of political sophistication.
In both data sets, our results provided little or no support for the notion
that a better understanding of abstract political ideas and the norms of Amer-
ican political culture would attenuate the signiﬁcance of racist and antiegal-
itarian motives. First of all, beliefs about racial superiority and inferioritywere
more strongly associated with afﬁrmative action attitudes among the sophis-
ticated than they were among relatively unsophisticated whites. Furthermore,
rather than being less strongly related to superiority beliefs among sophisti-
cates, political conservatism was, in fact, more strongly related to racism
among these individuals. Perhaps more interestingly, we found little support
for the notion that opposition to afﬁrmative action may be driven by egali-
tarianism, particularly among sophisticated respondents. Not only was egal-
itarianism negatively (rather than positively) related to afﬁrmative action op-
position, but the magnitude of this relationship actuallyincreasedwithpolitical
sophistication. Moreover, this general pattern of results held up even when
we restricted our deﬁnition of egalitarianism to equality of opportunity only.
Thus, while many prominent opponents of afﬁrmative action have argued that
opposition to this policy is rooted in an endorsement of Martin Luther King’s
original dream of equal opportunity—as well as the formally egalitarianvalues
at the heart of American political culture (e.g., Connerly 1996)—a growing
body of evidence suggests that just the opposite holds in mass publics. Rather
than being embedded in support for egalitarian values, opposition to afﬁr-
mative action shows every appearance of being driven by antiegalitarian val-
ues, particularly among those who should best understand the principles of
the American Creed.
Moreover, our results also imply that equality of opportunity is less of a
consensual value in American society than many have suggested, especially
among the politically knowledgeable. That is, in both samples, political con-
servatives were generally less supportive of equality of opportunity. This was
particularly the case among knowledgable conservatives, who should be most
attuned to the values at the heart of conservative thinking. Thus, while most
Americans do profess a relatively strong level of support for this basic value
(see McClosky and Zaller 1984; see also Schuman et al. 1997), they do not
do so evenly across the ideological spectrum. More broadly, these ﬁnd-
ings—along with our primary analysis of the antecedents of racial policy
attitudes—also imply that the content of the American Creed may be more170 Federico and Sidanius
complex and contradictory than many students of race relations have been
willing to admit. Although the notion of a relatively unitary Americanpolitical
culture centered on the principle of formal equality has held a great deal of
sway in studies of racial politics (e.g., Myrdal 1944; see Dawson 2000 for a
discussion), recent historical work suggests a far less homogenous Creed, one
in which unambiguously racist and antiegalitarian impulses are often found
right alongside egalitarian ones (Mills 1997; Smith 1997). Our ﬁndings not
only reinforce this claim at an empirical level, but they also suggest that this
ethos of contradiction may have survived a period in which racial attitudes
underwent an extensive process of liberalization. That is, despite changes in
public opinion that have greatly reduced overtprejudiceandbroadenedsupport
for the value of equal opportunity, we still ﬁnd a considerable level of political
disagreement with regard to the importance of thisvalue, aswellasacontinued
connection between racism, policy attitudes, and people’s ideological con-
victions. The fact that these trends were even more marked among those most
aware of the content of American political culture—that is, political sophis-
ticates—would seem to make the complex nature of the American Creed even
more apparent.
11
Finally, at a more technical level, our comparative analysis of the mod-
erating effects of political sophistication and education lent support to the idea
that the latter variable may not be the most reliable indicator of the degree
to which survey respondents understand abstract political ideas and the norms
of mainstream American political culture. More precisely, ourresultsindicated
that sophistication was generally more likely to moderate the key relationships
11. One objection to our ﬁndings involves the possibility that sophistication-based differences
in the strength of the relationships between key variables may be an artifact of different levels
of measurement error and/or variance across the two groups (Judd, Krosnick, and Milburn 1981).
In order to deal with this problem, we obtained corrected estimates of these relationships using
Herting’s (1985) LISREL-based method for disattenuating regressioncoefﬁcientsforunreliability.
In these analyses, the regressions reported in tables 1–4 were repeated at each sophistication
level using multigroup LISREL models in which each variable was speciﬁed as a latent factor
indicated by one measured variable, i.e., respondents’ scores on the scale for that variable. To
correct the actual estimates, the single factor loading for each variable was set to the square root
of its reliability in each sophistication group, and the error variance for the single indicator was
set to the square root of , where R is the reliability of the variable in that group. To test
2 1  R
the differences between the corrected coefﬁcients for each predictor across groups, they were
constrained to equality across the groups in separate model runs; a reliable difference was
indicated when this constraint produced a signiﬁcant decline in model ﬁt (as indicated by a chi-
square difference test, which also has the advantage of being a more conservative test than the
t-test used to assess interactions in regression; see Jo ¨reskog and So ¨rbom 1993). Unstandardized
regression coefﬁcients, which are robust with regard to between-group variance differences (see
Pedhazur 1982, pp. 30–32, for a demonstration), were used in all analyses as an additional
safeguard. The results of these analyses were identical to those reportedabove,withoneexception:
in the 1992 NES, the net relationship between evaluative racial superiority and afﬁrmative action
opposition was signiﬁcant in both groups (i.e, , in the low group, , in the high b p .27 b p .28
group; both ). The two coefﬁcients did not differ signiﬁcantly ( ). While this p’s ! .001 p 1 .10
result does not suggest that sophistication strengthened the relationship between prejudice and
afﬁrmative action attitudes, it still runs counter to the prediction that racism should have less of
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examined in this study. This pattern wasparticularlyapparentwhenwedirectly
compared the moderating effects of each variable in a series of simultaneous
interaction models. Thus, while we do not discount the important role of
education in the shaping of racial attitudes—particularly with regard to its
tendency to reduce overall levels of prejudice (see Steinberg and Selznick
1969; see also Federico and Sidanius 2000)—our ﬁndings suggest that re-
searchers interested in the role of abstract political understanding and aware-
ness in the organization of racial attitudes into clusters of related beliefs may
want to rely more heavily on direct measures of understanding, such as the
knowledge indices used here.
In conclusion, while it is clear that racial policy attitudes are not merely a
function of racist and antiegalitarian motives—and that the purely political
considerations that animate mainstream discourse are as relevant to debates
about racial policy as they are to disputes in other policy areas (see Sniderman
et al. 2000 for a discussion)—there may now bereasontoregardthehypothesis
that a better understanding of political ideas and the norms of the broader
political culture should attenuate the impact of prejudicialfactorswithacertain
amount of skepticism, given the number of disconﬁrmations that have now
emerged (see also Jackman and Muha 1984; Sidanius et al. 1996, 2000).
Nevertheless, while thereisthusa great dealofevidencecallingthishypothesis
into question with regard to both the mass public and various student pop-
ulations (see Sidanius et al. 1996), it is still conceivable that the sophistication
hypothesis may hold among members of certain clearly demarcated groups
of political actors. Here, we are alluding to the population of “true political
elites,” including party leaders, academics, political consultants, journalists
and newspaper editors, and various government ofﬁcials (Converse 1964;
McClosky and Zaller 1984). While the logic of existing theory and research
in this area gives us no reason to expect this hypothesis to be more valid
within this select population than in any other, it is also clear that principled
opposition to afﬁrmative action has resonated strongly with certain members
of these groups, often inspiring eloquent and genuinely race-neutralarguments
against the policy (see Connerly 1996; Glazer 1975). Moreover, students of
public opinion have suggested that the beliefs of these elites may differ even
from those of the most highly sophisticated portion of the mass public (see
Converse 1980). As such, this issue cannot be considered settled until this
most select of populations has been examined and our ﬁndings have been
replicated. We hope that such research will be forthcoming.172 Federico and Sidanius
Appendix
Items from the 1986 and 1992 National Election Studies
Political Sophistication
1986 NES. Recognition of political ﬁgures: Introduced with “Now we have a set of
questions concerning various public ﬁgures. We want to see how much information
about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers and the like.” Items:
“The ﬁrst name is George Bush. What job or political ofﬁce does he hold now,”
“Caspar Weinberger,” “William Rehnquist,” “Paul Volcker,” “Robert Dole,” and “Tip
O’Neill” (v343, v344, v345, v346, v347, v347). Control of Congress: “Do you happen
to know which party had the most members in the House of Representatives in Wash-
ington before the election (this/last) month?” and “Do you happen to know which
party had the most members in the U.S. Senate before the elections (this/last) month?”
(v349 and v350). Relative placements of groups and candidates: Democrats on 7-
point liberalism–conservatism scale (v393) versus Republicans on liberal-
ism–conservatism scale (v394); Democrats on 7-point U.S. should become less versus
more involved in Central America scale (v435) versus Republicans on become less
versus more involved in Central America scale (v436); Democrats on 7-point increase/
decrease defense spending scale (v412) versus Republicans on increase/decrease de-
fense spending scale (v413); Democrats on 7-point fewer versus more government
services and spending scale (v455) versus Republicans on fewer versus more gov-
ernment services and spending scale (v456); Reagan on liberalism–conservatism scale
(v387) versus Democrats on liberalism–conservatism scale (v393).
1992 NES. Recognition of political ﬁgures: Introduced with “Now we have a set
of questions concerning various public ﬁgures. We want to see how much information
about them gets out to the public from television, newspapers and the like.” Items:
“The ﬁrst name is Dan Quayle. What job or political ofﬁcedoes heholdnow,”“William
Rehnquist,” “Boris Yeltsin,” and “Tom Foley” (v5916, v5917, v5918, v5919). General
information about the political system: “Which party is more conservative?” (v5915),
“Who has the ﬁnal responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not . . . is it
the President, the Congress, the Supreme Court, or don’t you know?” (v5920), and,
“And whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the Federal Courts . . . the
President, the Congress, the Supreme Court, or don’t you know?” (v5921). Relative
placements of political parties: Democrats on 7-point increase/decrease defensespend-
ing scale (v3705) versus Republicans on increase/decrease defense spending scale
(v3704); Democrats on 7-point increase/decrease defense spending scale (v3711) ver-
sus Republicans on increase/decrease defense spending scale (v3710); Democrats on
7-point liberalism-conservatism scale (v3518) versus Republicans on liberalism-con-
servatism scale (v3517).
Political Conservatism
1986 NES and 1992 NES. Liberal–conservative scale: “We hear a lot of talk these
days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on which the politicalSophistication and Racial Policy Attitudes 173
views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely con-
servative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much
about this?” (v385 in 1986, v3509 in 1992). Party identiﬁcation: Summary variable
(v300 in 1986, v3634 in 1992) based on “Generally speaking, do you usually think
of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what,” “Would you call
yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very strong Republican/Democrat,”
and “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic
Party?” Feeling thermometers: conservatives (v150 in 1986, v5319 in 1992), liberals
(v153 in 1986, v5326 in 1992), Democratic Party (v146 in 1986, v3317 in 1992),
Republican Party (v147 in 1986, v3318 in 1992).
Beliefs about Government
1986 NES and 1992 NES. “Some people think the government should provide fewer
services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending.
Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services
even if it means an increase in spending. Where would you place yourself on this
scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?” (v448 in 1986, v3701 in 1992)
Individualism
1986 NES. “Most people who don’t get ahead should not blame the system; they have
only themselves to blame,” “Hard work offers little guarantee of success,” “If people
work hard they almost always get what they want. Most people who do not get ahead
in life probably work as hard as people who do,” “Any person who is willing to work
hard has a good chance of succeeding,” and “Even if people try hard they often cannot
reach their goals” (v508–v513).
Classical Racism
1986 NES. “The differences are brought about by God; God made the races different
as part of his divine plan,” and “Blacks come from a less able race and this explains
why blacks are not as well off as whites in America” (v578 and v582).
Evaluative Racial Superiority
1992 NES. Hardworking: “Now I have some questions about different groups in our
society. I’m going to show you a 7-point scale on which the characteristics of the
people in a group can be rated. In the ﬁrst statement a score of 1 means that you think
almost all of the people in that group tend to be ‘hard-working.’ A score of 7 means
that almost all of the people in the group are ‘lazy.’ A score of 4 means that you
think that most people in the group are not closer to one end or the other, and of
course you may choose any number in between,” “Where would you rate whites in
general on this scale?” (v6221), “Blacks?” (v6222). Intelligent: “The next set asks if
people in each group tend to be unintelligent or tend to be intelligent.” “Where would174 Federico and Sidanius
you rate whites in general on this scale?” (v6225), “Blacks?” (v6226). Peaceful: “Do
people in these groups tend to be violent or do they tend to be peaceful?” “Where
would you rate whites in general on this scale?” (v6229), “Blacks?” (v6230).
General Egalitarianism
1986 NES and 1992 NES. “Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure
that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed,” “We have gone too far in pushing
equal rights in this country,” “One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t
give everyone an equal chance,” “This country would be better off if we worried less
about how equal people are,” “It is not really that big of a problem if some people
have more of a chance in life than others,” and “If people were treated more equally
in this country we would have many fewer problems” (v364–v369 in 1986;
v6024–v6029 in 1992).
Opposition to Afﬁrmative Action
1986 NES and 1992 NES. “Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks
should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference
in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites.
What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion
of blacks?” and “Some people say that because of past discrimination it is sometimes
necessary for colleges and universities to reserve openings for black students. Others
oppose quotas because they say quotas discriminate against whites. What about your
opinion—are you for or against quotas to admit black students?” (v476 and v478 in
1986; v5936 and v5948 in 1992).
Demographics
1986 NES. Age: v595. Gender: v755. Education: v599 (years of education) and v602
(highest degree completed). Income: v733 and v734.Southversusnon-Southresidence:
dummy based on v25.
1992 NES. Age: v3903. Gender: v4201. Education: v3905 (years of education) and
v3908 (highest degree completed). Income: v4104. South versus non-South residence:
dummy based on v3104.
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